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Booze: A Constitutional Anomaly? 
NICHOLAS SGROI 
Alcohol has had quite an interesting history when looked at within the lens 
of the United States Constitution. As you scroll through the amendments, the 
only consumable substance mentioned is alcohol…two different times. The 
Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the “manufacture, sale, or transportation of 
intoxicating liquors."1 This lasted for thirteen years until Section 1 of the 
Twenty-first Amendment explicitly repealed the Eighteenth.2 Section Two of 
this amendment additionally states that “transportation or importation into any 
state, territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”3 Its 
standing as the only consumable substance within the amendments is not the 
only thing that sets it apart in regard to the Constitution. Alcohol also appears 
to be an exceptional good to the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Constitution as seen in Lebamoff v. Whitmer.4 
Lebamoff Enterprises (Lebamoff), a wine retailer based in northeast Indiana 
(about sixty miles from the border of Michigan) along with several Michigan 
wine consumers filed a lawsuit against The Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers 
Association.5 The suit alleged that Michigan’s recently amended Liquor Control 
Code violates the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.6 
The new “law allows in-state retailers to deliver directly to consumers using 
state-licensed ‘third party facilitators’ or common carriers like FedEx or UPS.”7 
This, of course, excludes out-of-state retailers, like Lebamoff, from delivering 
directly to consumers within Michigan. 
The Commerce Clause can be found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the 
U.S. Constitution and gives Congress power to “regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”8 
Implicit, but widely recognized, within the Commerce Clause is the Dormant 
Commerce Clause which “prohibits state laws that unduly restrict interstate 
commerce.”9 The Dormant Commerce Clause “directly limit[s] the States' 
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power to discriminate against interstate commerce, prohibits economic 
protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state 
economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”10 However, if the 
state’s law discriminates against out-of-state actors, the law can still be 
sustained if it is narrowly tailored to “advance[e] a legitimate local purpose.”11 
This is for laws which regulate all goods…but is alcohol somewhat immune to 
this? 
The Twenty-first Amendment seems to exempt state laws regarding alcohol 
from the grasp of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Under this amendment, the 
states are granted the power to regulate commerce within their borders, when 
that commerce is alcohol distribution.12 So, alcohol distribution laws are granted 
a “different rule” when faced with a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.13 
We must “ask whether the challenged requirement can be justified as a public 
health or safety measure or on some other legitimate nonprotectionist ground.”14 
Prior to the Eighteenth Amendment, alcohol was sold by producers through 
“tied-house” saloons which they supplied with a building and equipment in 
return for the promise that they only sell their product and meet minimum sales 
goals.15 This meant cheap drinks for consumers.16 With these low prices, came 
excessive alcohol consumption followed by “addiction, crime, violence, and 
family troubles.”17 The Eighteenth Amendment was in place for thirteen years 
to try to combat the troubles brought on by the “tied house” saloons and also 
seemingly expanded the federal government’s role in law enforcement.18 Once 
the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed, discretion over alcohol regulation was 
placed with the states.19 Following passage of the Twenty-first Amendment, all 
of the states created their own system for alcohol distribution and regulation.20 
Michigan, like many states in this country, has a three-tier system for 
alcohol distribution.21 Producers, wholesalers, and retailers make up these 
tiers.22 The system has requirements and limitations of what tiers and entities 
can sell to others.23 State approved producers (first tier) must sell directly to 
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wholesalers located within the state (second tier).24 Then, these in-state 
wholesalers are permitted to sell only to retailers located in the state (third 
tier).25 These in-state retailers have the exclusive right to then sell to the 
consumers.26 Note that producers and wholesalers in Michigan may not sell 
directly to consumers and require in-state retailers as an intermediary.27 The 
tiers must operate independently meaning there is no joint marketing 
cooperation or common ownership amongst the tiers.28 
So, was Michigan’s law put in place as a public health or safety measure—
or was it strictly protectionist? The Court has already ruled that a three-tier 
system for alcohol distribution is “unquestionably legitimate” under their 
Twenty-first Amendment rights.29 This may not be the best system for an 
efficient market, but “efficiency is not the goal of the Twenty-first 
Amendment.”30 Instead, the goal of the Twenty-first amendment is to allow the 
individual states to make choices in how they want to regulate alcohol within 
their own borders.31 
The Sixth Circuit found that Michigan’s law can be justified on many 
legitimate state interests outside of protectionist grounds.32 Michigan, like the 
other states, aims to promote temperance through their distribution regime.33 
The three-tier system is in place for a reason. It allows Michigan to regulate each 
tier closely by imposing health and safety regulations, price controls, and 
taxes.34 The new amendment to the Liquor Control Code ensures that all alcohol 
which enters its borders, it can regulate.35 Therefore, “Michigan ultimately 
controls the amount of alcohol sold within its borders.”36 If Lebamoff was to 
win their challenge, the three-tier system would not function correctly.37 Instead 
of going through the regulated Michigan wholesalers, the out-of-state retailer 
would be selling directly to the consumer.38 Michigan could not respond to this 
problem by controlling prices set by out-of-state wholesalers, as this would 
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violate the Extraterritoriality Doctrine which is rooted in the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.39 
The wholesaler tier in the Michigan system is absolutely crucial as it is 
heavily taxed.40 This creates a higher mark-up for the alcohol than would be 
found in a free market.41 This is on purpose—going back to Michigan’s interest 
in promoting temperance and “limiting consumption” of their residents.42 
Whenever there is a discrepancy between the free market price and a mark-up, 
it opens the door for outside competition to undercut prices.43 Therefore, out-
of-state retailers (like Lebamoff), who are not subject to the same strict 
regulations as in-state distributors are able to take advantage of the price 
discrepancy.44 Michigan has a legitimate fear that if consumer price for alcohol 
is cheaper, which it presumably would be if companies like Lebamoff could 
undercut the price, alcohol consumption could increase.45 Ensuring that 
Michigan’s alcohol distribution regulatory system stays intact is certainly a 
legitimate nonprotectionist ground for the amended law. 
Lebamoff also claims that the law violates the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.46 The clause says “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.”47 This clause is 
basically to place “the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens 
of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States 
are concerned.”48 But Crowley v. Christensen had stated that the right to 
distribute was neither a privilege nor an immunity.49 On top of this, Michigan’s 
law does not stop Indiana residents from opening up a physical location in 
Michigan, getting a Michigan retail license, and playing by Michigan’s 
regulatory rules.50 
In April of 2020, the Sixth Circuit decided Lebamoff v. Whitmer in favor of 
Michigan’s law.51 Three months later, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed 
by Lebamoff in hopes that the Supreme Court would take the case for review.52 
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On January 11, 2021, the petition was denied. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
did not give an explanation for its denial of the petition. The Court has discretion 
when reviewing cases.53 Denial of the petition does not necessarily mean that it 
agrees with the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, rather it means that only three or fewer 
judges determined that the case warranted Supreme Court review.54 Moving 
forward, the Sixth Circuit will continue to use the same standards to govern 
similar cases.55 
This holding means a few things. The alcohol market in states like Michigan 
with a strict three-tier system will be less competitive. The market will be an 
insulated bubble preventing out-of-state retailers from entering it. Without this 
outside competition fighting for market share, in-state retailers will be able to 
corner the market and keep their prices up. If the borders were truly open, out-
of-state retailers could come in without the regulatory burden of the state and 
undercut prices—something consumers would certainly be happy about, but 
which would put a dent into the function of the tiered system. Out-of-state 
retailers who aren’t able to freely work within neighboring states will be 
affected. However, as mentioned earlier, if they want to operate within the state, 
they can work within that state’s regulatory framework to do so. Obviously, this 
isn’t ideal for consumers, but given the nature of alcohol’s history in America 
and the states’ discretion over it, this clearly can be seen as justified through 
health and safety measures. Lebamoff was decided correctly due to alcohol’s 
status as the only consumable substance mentioned explicitly in the 
Constitution, the states’ rights to regulate alcohol for health and safety reasons, 
and alcohol’s longstanding history in this country. Therefore, alcohol is a 
justified exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
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